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LISTENING FOR THE FUTURE IN
THE VOICES OF THE PAST:
John T. Noonan, Jr. on
Love and Power in Human History
M. Cathleen Kaveny*
I.

INTRODUCrION

With the publication of After Virtue in 1981, Alasdair
Maclntyre revolutionized the study of post-Enlightenment moral
philosophy by insisting that it repent of its current pretensions to a
view from eternity and confess its temporal roots in the long and
motley history of human reflection about the good life.' Almost a
quarter of a century earlier, John T. Noonan, Jr., a young Harvardtrained legal scholar who possessed a doctorate in philosophy from
Catholic University, had waged a similar battle against the widespread misconception of the medieval concept of usury as monolithic, self-contained, and immutable.2
Working with medieval authors who were themselves largely
insensitive to the idea of historicity, writing in the context of a preVatican II Catholicism still imbued with the abstract and ahistorical
spirit of nineteenth century neo-Thomism, Noonan demonstrated
in his first book that the concept of usury was in fact a fusion of
concrete theological, ethical, economic, and legal concerns which
were not stagnant, but organically developing. In so doing, he gave
Catholic Christianity a more adequate conception of its past. More
than that, he gestured optimistically toward its future. Tracing how
the absolute prohibition of usury, defined as any lending of money
at interest, was circumscribed, attenuated, and finally abandoned
by succeeding generations of moral theologians and canon lawyers,
Noonan underscored that the Church could and did change its
mind about important moral issues which were held to implicate
unalterable strictures of the natural law. Revealing that an increased willingness on the part of moralists to acknowledge that
moral experience of Christians professionally involved in the practices of commerce and banking had fueled the evolution of the
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue (U of Notre Dame Press, 1981).
2. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Scholastic Analysis of Usury (Harvard U Press, 1957).
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usury doctrine in past centuries, Noonan nourished the hope for a
stronger voice of lay experience in ecclesial discussions of moral
issues throughout the years to come.
Written during the Second Vatican Council (and before
Humanae Vitae3 was issued), his second magisterial study, Contraception, 4 incorporated and extended both of these insights. Since
that time Noonan's work on such topics as the canon law of marriage,5 slavery,6 bribery,7 and religious liberty,8 has consistently embodied the conviction that moral teachings and religious doctrines
must not be divorced from the historical and social context engendering them. Prodigious in learning as well as graceful and
often witty in style, his books draw upon sources both ancient and
modern, composed in several languages, and cutting across the disciplines of theology, philosophy, history and law.
My purpose in this review article is not primarily to distill into
capsule form the conclusions Noonan reaches in each of his detailed tomes. Indeed, it would violate Noonan's own historical sensibilities to suggest that these conclusions can be wrenched without
distortion from his discussion of the particular episodes which give
them shape and substance. Metaphorically speaking, my aim is
rather to look for a moment at the mirror itself rather than at the
reflection placed before our gaze. In the conviction that they cannot fail to influence his perspective, and our perspective through
his, I hope to highlight some of Noonan's own normative commitments regarding such fundamental issues as epistemology, theological anthropology, and the relation of love, justice, and law. I also
hope to indicate several ways in which his work, bearing on the
past, might offer some direction for present and future discussions
in theological ethics.

3. Pope Paul VI Humanae Vitae 1968 in Joseph Gremillion, ed, The Gospel of Peace
and Justice (Orbis Books, 1976).
4. John T. Noonan, Contraception:A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists (expanded edition, Belknap Press of Harvard U Press, 1986).
5. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Power to Dissolve: Lawyers and Marriages in the Courts
of the Roman Curia (Belknap Press of Harvard U Press, 1972).
6. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Antelope: The Ordeal of the Recaptured Africans in the
Administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams (U of California Press, 1977).
7. John T. Noonan, Jr., Bribes (Macmillan Publishing Co, 1984).
8. John T. Noonan, Jr., The Believer and the Powers that Are: Cases, History, and
Other Data Bearing on the Relation of Religion and Government (Macmillan Publishing
Co, 1987).
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II. A MULTIFACETED HISTORICITY
A. An Epistemological Conviction
Why is it so important for Noonan to situate his moral analysis

historically? First, as with Maclntyre, Noonan's stance presupposes an epistemological outlook. Knowledge in general, moral
knowledge in particular, is both sought after and articulated in particular times and places. Over the years, Noonan's construal of
what counts as adequately situating a moral concept or practice has
consistently expanded. While interdisciplinary in character, his
first book 9 is best characterized as a history of ideas. Noonan's
primary concern is to trace the development of the moral concept
of usury through the treatises of the theologians and canonists who
discuss it; his consideration of the actual social and economic circumstances in which the doctrine was forged and applied lacks detail and plays a subsidiary role.
Contraception' expands the database of which Noonan takes
account in at least two ways. First, he pays more attention to questions of a concrete nature: what sort of person practices contraception, under what social and familial circumstances, and by what
means. Secondly, he sketches the polemical context in which the
doctrine developed so as better to illuminate both its impetus and
ultimate purpose. For example, it is only in light of Augustine's
experience with the anti-procreative ethic of the Manichees that we
can accurately grasp the saint's unwavering conviction that all contraceptive practices (including the "rhythm method") count as sinful violations of the primary procreative purpose of marriage."
However, notwithstanding its attention to social situation and
political or doctrinal controversy, Contraception2 , like the usury
book, is still best described as intellectual history. Noonan's fundamental stress still falls upon the development of doctrine. Despite
their importance, the historical background and social context appear not as proper centers of attention in themselves, but as the
indispensable prerequisites to proper understanding of moral
ideas.
9. Noonan, Usury (cited in note 2).
10. Noonan, Contraception (cited in note 4).
11. Id at 107-139.
12. Id.
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By contrast, Noonan's next book, The Power to Dissolve 3
reveals a marked shift in concern. Aptly subtitled "Lawyers and
Marriages in the Courts of the Roman Curia," the book is not focused upon the development of canonical teachings about marriage
and annulment, but more broadly upon the moral practices they
foster and the living system of canon law in which they take their
place. More specifically, Noonan refuses to separate the ideas and
ideals of canon law from the way in which they were formulated by
and applied to particular human persons in the context of human
institutions. Consequently, the book is organized around six specific cases, annulment petitions brought before the Roman ecclesiastical courts between' 1653 and 1923. Each case presents the Curia
with the unavoidable task of ranking the priority of various commitments of the tradition which stand in mutual tension, such as
between the theologically driven affirmation of the possibility of a
valid, intentionally virginal marriage (as typified in the Catholic
tradition by that of Mary and Joseph) and the more practically
minded Augustinian view that persons contracting marriage must
be open to the good of procreation. 14 Following their often serpentine courses through different layers of ecclesiastical bureaucracy,
Noonan shows how the final disposition of each case depends as
much upon the individual quirks of the persons involved as upon
more abstract and impersonal doctrinal exigencies.
Noonan's most recent massive historical studies, a treatise on
bribery 15 and a casebook with commentary on religious liberty 6
manifest his increasing dexterity in reflecting the development of
moral and legal movements through the prism of individual lives
and choices. One might say that Noonan's insistence upon situating moral concepts not only in rough social context, but even
more precisely within the lives of particular persons, bespeaks an
epistemological commitment to historical specificity which surpasses even that of Maclntyre. Yet his commitment to such specificity is not merely epistemological. It is a necessary entailment of
his theological anthropology, and the conception of human obligations to one and other which it generates.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Noonan, The Power to Dissolve (cited in note 5).
Id at 80-122.
Noonan, Bribes (cited in note 7).
Noonan, The Believer and the Powers that Are (cited in note 8).
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B.

An Anthropological Conception

For Noonan, the study of ethics, law, and theology is an historical enterprise because the persons who engage in these activities
are historical beings. Moreover, because human nature is essentially social, and human society also moves within time, those of us
who are living today stand in community and conversation with the
dead. The shape of our minds and hearts is informed by the ideas
and purposes of our forebears much as the shape of our bodies is
informed by their genetic material. We manifest our fidelity to the
persons of the past not in slavish repetition of old formulas, but in
sensitively attempting to discern the core purposes of traditional
doctrine, and creatively applying it to a new situation. Such a process requires us both to understand and to judge our predecessors.
In sifting through their thought we must separate insights of
perduring value from the rough bundle of time-bound presuppositions and failures of will and vision which trap them. This demythologizing exercise is by no means easy, nor untouched by
ambiguity. The best and most holy of persons can remain tragically
constrained by their context. For example, while praising Pope
Benedict XIV as a man "[of] intelligence seasoned by experience
and joined to goodness,' 7 Noonan also hints of the rigid order
constricting the Pope's mind by depicting his world in terms of the
yearbook issued at that time by the Roman Curia. Concluding
with a flourish his detailed and ironic catalog of the odd scraps of
information contained in the yearbook, Noonan writes: "This hieratic structure on the horarium of Italy, which opened with the date
of the creation of the world, continued with the dates of the creation of cardinals, and closed with the schedule of committee meetings of the Inquisition, was the universe of Prospero Lambertini, in
which he lived, for which, perforce, he spoke as Pope."'"
Just as Noonan struggles against perceiving the past as a mythical golden age, so he resists the temptation to portray the great
sins of our collective history as performed by monsters, not human
beings. True, he does take poetic satisfaction in the fact that the
mean-spirited Bishop of Beauvais responsible for condemning Joan
of Arc to the stake bore the name "Pierre Cauchon" or "Peter
Pig"'19 and that the bribe-taking Roman praetor painted by Cicero
17. Noonan, The Power to Dissolve at 123 (cited in note 5).
18. Id at 125.
19. Noonan, The Believers and the Powers that Are at 45-51 (cited in note 8).
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as so foul, cruel, greedy, and lustful in his corruption that he bordered on the inhuman was known as "Verres" or "Hog. ' 20 Yet
Noonan cautions that we can never know if the Hog of Cicero's
account ever actually existed; Cicero, after all, was an expert orator
charged with the role of prosecuting attorney, and his more colorful accusations should be interpreted accordingly.
In Noonan's accounts even fundamentally admirable persons
appear as agents of banal and dishonorable behavior. Sir Francis
Bacon was a taker of bribes, John Quincy Adams a giver of them.
However, most wrongdoing, even in its more spectacular forms, is
performed by persons whose character is an ordinary blend of
good and evil. Samuel Pepys, one of Noonan's most intriguing and
industrious practitioners of graft, acted as clerk to the British Naval
Board in the mid-seventeenth century and "received from those
interested in his official actions animals, clothing, food, furniture,
silverware, cash and sex."' 2 1 Meticulously recording these transactions in his private journal, gleefully totaling his net worth on New
Year's Eve 1664, and showering God with heartfelt praise for the
increase, Pepys unwittingly furnishes posterity with incontrovertible evidence of his own greed, corruption, and lubriciousness.
Yet even while reprinting particularly damning excerpts from
the journal, Noonan is at pains to prevent his readers from consigning Pepys to a moral realm too far removed from the one in
which we locate ourselves. Pepys, "though he committed adultery,
loved his wife," and "though he was in the pay of the Navy's suppliers and the king's contractors, loved the Navy and served the
king." 22 Evoking "the complexity of [Pepy's] conscience," Noonan
traces the path of self-deception by which he quelled his inner misgivings. "Before his inner judge he customarily claimed to observe
two rules: No one was hurt by what he took. What he got was
voluntarily given. '2 3 Insisting that we recognize the ambiguity
which characterized each human heart, Noonan forestalls our initial instinct to recoil against Pepys and his corruptions as repulsive,
alien, and therefore irrelevant to us. Rather, we are absorbed by
Pepys' rationalizations and are led to wonder under what circumstances we ourselves might have done the same thing. To acknowledge our continuing community with Pepys and others like him is
20.
21.
22.
23.

Noonan, Bribes at 46-54 (cited in note 7).
Id at 375.
Id at 387.
Id at 382.
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to give such persons their due in justice and in charity. No less
significantly, it can also force us to exercise greater vigilance regarding the myriad ways in which self-deception goes hand in hand
with sin in our own lives. Chronicling the histories of bribe-takers
and bribe-givers, ecclesiastical bureaucrats long dead and American politicians still living, Noonan deftly traces a map of the pitfalls
facing all of us who struggle to conduct our own lives with moral
seriousness.
C. Moral Commitment
Noonan's focus on the lives and choices of individuals also implies an anthropology which resonates deeply with the Catholic
personalism developed earlier in the twentieth century, and most
strikingly with what David Hollenbach 24 calls the "personalist communitarianism" of Jacques Maritain. 25 For both Maritain and Noonan, each human person, gifted with both intelligence and will and
possessed of "spiritual superexistence through knowledge and
through love, '2 6 demands the utmost respect in the arrangement of
temporal matters. As Maritain puts it, every human being is "thus
in some fashion a whole, not merely a part '27 of a larger entity.
Yet this does not mean that persons are atomistic, isolated individuals; Maritain goes on to say that "the person is a whole, but is not
a closed whole, it is an open whole", blessedly open toward other
persons for "communications of intelligence and love." 28 Persons,
then, are essentially social, and created to live together in societies
which are organized by the rule of law. Yet it also implies that the
common good can be no straightforward utilitarian calculus which
undercuts the sanctity of the individual persons constituting the
community. The common good "is therefore common to the whole
and to the parts,which are themselves wholes, since the very notion
of person means totality; it is common to the whole and to the
24. David Hollenbach, The Common Good Revisited in 50 Theological Studies 70-94
(1989).
25. John T. Noonan, Jr., Persons and Masks of the Law (Farrar, Straus and Giroux,

1976). Noonan quotes a passage from Maritain's Humanisme Integral (F. Aubier, 1936) on
the interweaving of masks and roles in the frontispiece to Persons and Masks of the Law.
26. Jacques Maritain, The Rights of Man and Natural Law at 3 (Charles Scribner's

Sons, 1943).
27. Id at 3.
28. Id at 5-6.

JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION

[Vol. 11

over which it flows back and which must all, benefit from
parts,
it.",29
Every student of Christian ethics is familiar with the internal
tensions which Maritain's personalist communitarianism engenders. Individuals are essentially and ultimately valuable, yet the
exigencies of community organization often require impersonal
rules, laws, and institutions which cannot afford to take into account the needs of particular persons. What, then, is the proper
relationship between the personal love possible between individuals and the less personal justice necessary to order their lives together? Furthermore, how can either love or justice be borne
within the abstract and sometimes rigid categories of law? Each
human being is a unique creature of God, yet shares with other
persons similar capacities and needs. In case of conflict, does love
for other persons give priority to the unique aspects of individuals,
or to their common human characteristics? Confounding in themselves, these questions are further obscured by the blot of human
sin and failure upon individual and social life.
Much of John Noonan's work can be viewed as an attempt to
investigate these tensions as they have arisen not only in ethical
theory, but in real life. In Persons and Masks of the Law,3" Noonan
reflects "The central problem ... of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power. We can often apply force to those we do not
see, but we cannot, I think, love them. Only in the response of
person to person can Augustine's sublime fusion be achieved, in
which justice is defined as 'love serving the one loved'."' 31 Like
Maritain and other Thomists, Noonan believes that the power of
law is necessary for social existence, not only to restrain wrongdoers, but to channel human energies toward cooperative relationships, and to teach the basic values of the society. 32 Standing at the
heart of any legal system are two entities: rules and persons. For
Noonan, the legal "process is rightly understood only if rules and
persons are seen as equally essential components, every rule depending on persons to frame, apply, and undergo it, every person
using rules."' 33 Grave moral dangers arise from letting go of either
component. On the one hand, the abandonment of impartially for29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id at 8-9.
Noonan, Persons and Masks (cited in note 25).
Id at xii.
Id at 12-13.
Id at 18.
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mulated rules can produce "monsters" which strangle justice with
favoritism. On the other, the subsumption of persons into the inexorable impersonality of rules can be ruthless.
Noonan's book on bribery exhaustively probes the former
problem: a bribe comprises "an inducement improperly influencing
the performance of a public function meant to be gratuitously exercised."' 3 A bribe-taking judge prostitutes justice and tramples
upon impartiality. In reproachful contrast to judicial graft and as
the paradigmatic just judge, the God of Deuteronomy and of the
apostle Paul eschews prosopolempsia-face-liftingor corrupt respect of persons.35 Justice must be impartial. Acknowledging the
necessity of the impersonal rules which give form to institutions
serving purposes beyond the individual, and recognizing the need
for human beings to participate in these institutions by playing socially defined roles, Noonan affirms such impartiality.
Yet in other writings, he stresses that at least as much damage
has been inflicted throughout history by neglect of the individual
persons interacting by necessity or by choice with the coercive
power of the legal system. A major culprit is the use of rules to
construct masks, or "ways of classifying individual human beings so
that their humanity is hidden and disavowed. '3 6 Playing on the
ambiguity of the Latin term "persona," Noonan explores several
ways in which the American legal system has allowed masks (personae) to be used to conceal persons (personae)
in both Persons
38
and Masks of the Law37 and The Antelope.
The latter provides a case study in one of the most deadly and
efficient uses of legal terms to obscure humanity, the subsumption
of enslaved Africans and their descendants under the category of
"property." The Antelope was a ship captured off the coast of
Florida by American agents in 1820, with 281 Africans destined for
the slave markets on board. At the time, it had been illegal for
over ten years to import slaves anywhere within the United States,
and the President had recently acquired power to assure the "safekeeping, support and removal beyond the United States" of Africans taken on captured ships. Despite these facts, over 100 Africans from the Antelope died, many of neglect or mistreatment, and
34.
35.
36.
37.

Noonan, Bribes at xi (cited in note 7).
Id at 61.
Noonan, Persons and Masks at 19 (cited in note 25).
Id.

38. Noonan, The Antelope (cited in note 6).
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nearly 40 were enslaved. Only about 120 of them were finally
deemed free persons, and were put on ships to Liberia seven years
after their capture. In The Antelope 9 , Noonan tells the tale of the
political machinations, the bureaucratic ennui, the petty calculations, and the self-delusion which enabled, for instance, men like
Judge William Davies and Justice William Johnson to "overcome"
their personal revulsion against slavery long enough to uphold its
legality under international law and decide that foreign slave traders should be allowed to recover their "property" in the courts of
the United States.4 °
According to Noonan, the masks which effect such moral catastrophes as that befalling the Antelope are of two kinds: those
imposed on others, such as "property" in the case of slaves, and
those imposed on oneself, such as "the court" and "the law" in the
case of judges rendering opinions.4 ' Practically and morally, they
are deeply interconnected: Practically, it is only by secreting their
own human feeling under impersonal masks that such fundamentally decent persons as Holmes, Cardozo, Wythe, and Jefferson
could bear to place such dehumanizing masks on the faces of those
over whom they exercised power.42 Morally, to mask another is
also to mask oneself. If for Noonan, as for Maritain, it is at the
essence of personhood to relate with knowledge and love to other
persons 43 then to treat another as less than human also denigrates
one's own humanity.
D.

A Case Study

One crucial problem which Noonan's writings raise without
fully answering is how to differentiate between judicial attention to
claimants that wrongfully "lifts up faces" and attention which pays
rightful regard to the "particular flesh and blood and consciousness" 44 standing before the bench. For example, in the vast majority of cases, the comparative financial status of the litigants appears
both immaterial to any legal dispute between them and irrelevant
to their status as persons. Indeed, as Noonan emphasizes, to favor
a particular petitioner because she is powerful and rich clearly
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id at 51-68.
Noonan, Persons and Masks at 21 (cited in note 25).
Id.
For example, id at 20 and 167.
Id at 26.
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seems to violate judicial impartiality. But what about giving special
concern to the poor? Consider Noonan's assessment of Judge Benjamin Cardozo's decision in the most famous tort case of the twentieth century, Palsgrafv Long Island Railroad.4 5 A forty-three year
old mother doing janitorial work to support her three children,
Helen Palsgraf was injured in a freak accident involving a railroad
employee while waiting for a train to the beach. She sued the railroad for negligence. Cardozo not only denied her claim for damages, but ordered her to pay both her own and the railroad's court
costs, a sum which would have amounted to more than her annual
income and which the railroad could have collected by selling her
personalty. Of Cardozo's imposition of costs, Noonan persuasively
argues that "only a judge who did not see who was before him
could have decreed such a result. ' 46 Under New York rules of
practice, this was a matter of judicial discretion, and it is hard not
to blame a judge who imposes costs upon a poor plaintiff bringing a
good-faith, colorable claim against a rich corporate defendant. In
fact, since the law explicitly gave Cardozo discretion in this matter,
one could even argue that his decision to levy costs on Helen Palsgraf was as much failure in applying rules as it was blindness in
assessing persons.
But Noonan does not address as forthrightly the question
which presents the tension between respect for rules and regard for
individual persons most acutely. Should Cardozo have taken account of Helen Palsgraf 's poverty and the railroad's great wealth in
actually deciding the case? More specifically, does Noonan's construal of respect for persons imply that in the last analysis, Helen
Palsgraf should have won her lawsuit against the Long Island Railroad? He does not explicitly say, but hints that his answer would
be in the affirmative. 47 Assuming for a moment that this is so, a
more subtle question presents itself. Precisely why does respect for
persons require her to win? Such respect could focus on two different aspects of Helen Palsgraf: the specific details of her life or the
features of her existence which she possesses in common with
many other persons. Noonan does not always distinguish between
the two.
45. 166 NE 99 (1928); Noonan, Persons and Masks at 111-151 (cited in note 25).
46. Id at 144.

47. This is not surprising, since Noonan does not conceive the purpose of Persons and
Masks of the Law as second-guessing judges but as exploring the interaction between individuals, rules, and the legal system.
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On the one hand, does Noonan think Cardozo should have
given decisive weight to the specific difficulties of Helen Palsgraf 's
particularlife, such as the fact that she was the sole support of her
children and already worked two jobs? The considerable effort
Noonan devotes to fleshing out impersonal law reports with the
details about her background supports this position, as does his
emphasis on the need for a love-informed justice which concentrates on the needs of concrete individuals. On the other hand,
certain of his remarks suggest that giving Mrs. Palsgraf such special
consideration would have been too automatically preferring this
David over this Goliath.48 Perhaps, then, respecting Mrs. Palsgraf
as a person entails taking account not of the aspects of her life
which are specific to her, but of the more generalizable fact of her
poverty and lack of social power. If this had been Cardozo's approach, he would have focused not on the actual troubles of Mrs.
Palsgraf, but on the more general social problems embodied in
them. This is not a moot point in our common law system where
judges make law, and where the opinions of those sitting on higher
courts have precedential weight. His position of power gave Cardozo both the freedom and the responsibility of shaping social policy through the legal framework he developed in deciding this case.
For example, Cardozo could have decided that the railroad had an
obligation to pay damages to persons like Helen Palsgraf, since it
could easily treat the amount as an operating cost which could be
distributed among all its passengers through slightly higher ticket
prices. That way, no one customer would be forced to bear the
entire brunt of an unfortunate accident.
Noonan may well believe that respecting Mrs. Palsgraf as a
person means taking account of the generalizable features of her
situation, such as her poverty and social powerlessness. Criticizing
Cardozo's failure to address the issues of social justice raised by the
case, he locates its source in Cardozo's inability to see the persons
standing before his bench. 49 But to adopt this construal of responsibility towards persons would begin to blur the distinction between respect for persons and regard for impersonal rules that
Noonan wants to maintain. As the preceding paragraph of this essay demonstrates, to talk about precedent and the more generalizable features of persons' lives is to begin to talk about rules again,
48. Id at 138.
49. Id at 137-139 (emphasis mine).
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albeit fairly specific ones. If the objection to Cardozo's opinion is
not so much that he failed to attend to Mrs. Palsgraf's particular
troubles but to the more general feature of her social status, why
not say that Cardozo articulated the rule of tort law in an unjust
fashion?
While Noonan does not provide a method for elucidating the
knotty problems discussed above in Persons and Masks of the
Law,50 one can read him as recommending a model of sorts in
Bribes.5 Suggesting that the Western viewpoint on bribery has
been profoundly influenced by its dominant religious traditions, he
points to a paradox historically abiding at the very heart of Christianity: the simultaneous merciful favor and just judgment of God,
who in Jesus Christ, both condemned our sin and brought us back
from its penalty. Noonan writes:
Only a consciousness committed to the mystery of Christian particularism-that God chose this people, this virgin, these apostles, these converts, this Church-could have insisted so fiercely
that God acts gratuitously. Only a consciousness committed to
the requirements of an impartial judge could have felt so keenly
the force of the cry that God is a just Judge. Only the mystery
that the Judge is also the Repurchaser, the Redeemer, the Giver
of himself could have made beliefs in impartiality and in favor
bearable. 2
Assuming that Noonan affirms the christology just described,
what light can be shed on the tensions within his version of personalist communitarianism? I offer three observations, all of which
flow much from my sense that Noonan conceives Christian ethics
as fundamentally a matter of imitatio Christi.5 3 First, since the relation between Christ's power as impersonal judge and his personal
love as savior is ultimately a theological mystery, we cannot expect
to work out its ethical implications in a fully systematic way. Secondly, we can, however, note that when God's impartiality is set
aside in the Bible, it is set aside on behalf of the weak. "God is
just, impartial, and simultaneously championing the cause of the
underdog. ' 54 This implies that in the process of making social
rules, which necessarily involves classifying persons in general
terms, we should grant a prime facie legitimacy to categories
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Noonan, Persons and Masks (cited in note 25).
Noonan, Bribes (cited in note 7).
Id at 82.
Noonan, Bribes at 65, 67 (cited in note 7).
Id at 16.
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designed to protect the poor and socially vulnerable. Human persons have an ultimate reality that human rules do not. So does
human pain. The sight of it should force a judge at least to reconsider the adequacy of the categories used by any given rule to classify persons. Thirdly and finally, divine mercy and judgment are
ultimately focused on each person in all her individuality.55 This
intimates that no matter how sensitive a rule or category might be
to general features of human need, earthly judges can never afford
to ignore the particularity of the person standing before them. In
the end, if a judge must err, it is better to do so in favor of the
person rather than the rule. Equity trumps law.
III.

CREATIVITY, NOT MAGIC:

SOME THOUGHTS ON NOONAN

AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL THEOLOGY

While discussing the credibility of the canonical practice of
granting annulments, Noonan draws an intriguing distinction between creativity and magic in the development of doctrine.
Magic, the whisking away of difficulties by a nod, the replacement of reality by illusion, is, however, but one step from creativity, the transformation of a situation by energetic innovation.
Like magic, creativity connotes spontaneity and freedom from
iron law, but it also implies labor and increase by organic
development.5 6
Noonan's distinction, of course, applies as much to moral theology
as it does to canon law. In what follows, I would like to explore
three areas in which his work might help contemporary Catholic
moral theology turn toward creativity and away from magic as it
faces the challenges of the Post-Vatican II Church.
A. Enduring Concerns of the Gospel
The year 1991 marked the centennial of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical Rerum Novarum, widely lauded as inaugurating modern
Roman Catholic social teaching decisively proclaimed by the Second Vatican Council's pastoral constitution on the church and the
modern world, Gaudium et Spes. 7 Examining the substantial body
of scholarly literature on social justice which has grown up since
55.
56.
57.
World
1976).

Id at 217.
Noonan, The Power to Dissolve at xvii (cited in note 5).
Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes: PastoralConstitution on the Church in the Modern
(1965), in Joseph Gremillion, ed, The Gospel of Peace and Justice (Orbis Books,
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Vatican II, an unwary reader might conclude that the Catholic tradition was uninterested in such issues before the late nineteenth
century. John Noonan's work on usury demonstrates that such a
conclusion would be erroneous. While the prohibition of usury,
taken most stringently to mean all lending money at interest, was
greatly tempered over the centuries, its stable (although often unrecognized) core were the "desires to prevent exploitation of the
poor and to discourage reckless profit."58
The object of considerable attention on the part of theologians, canonists, prelates and businessmen between the twelfth and
eighteenth centuries, the Church's teaching on usury has all but
been forgotten (except perhaps as an example of the Church's ability to change its mind about moral issues). 59 No allusions to usury
60
appear in many important contemporary works on social justice
or recent histories of moral theology. 61 Their authors do not claim,
of course, that no theoretical or practical interest in questions of
social justice existed between the biblical or patristic eras and the
time of Leo XIII. They have simply delimited their topic in such a
way that the medieval discussion of usury falls outside of it.
I would like to suggest, however, that reintegrating this aspect
of scholastic thought into contemporary scholarly consciousness
could alleviate an unhelpful competition which J.A. DiNoia argues
has arisen between the twin aims of the Second Vatican Council,
aggiornamento (modernization) and ressourcement (historical retrieval). According to DiNoia, the American tendency to give unqualified priority to aggiornamento unfortunately resulted in a
conception of Vatican II as "representing a sharp break" with previous centuries, particularly the scholastic era, and thus undercut
the impetus for retrieving the panoply of riches in the tradition.62
DiNoia's own thesis can be expressed with the maxim "Ressource58. Noonan, Usury at 170 (cited in note 2).
59. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Development in Moral Doctrine 54 Theological Studies
662-77 (1993).
60. See, for example, Gremillion, ed, Introduction to The Gospel of Peace and Justice
(cited in note 57); John C. Haughey, ed, The Faith that Does Justice: Examining the Christian Sources for Social Change (Paulist Press, 1977); David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict:
Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic Human Rights Tradition (Paulist Press, 1979).
61. See, for example, John Mahoney, The Making of Moral Theology: A Study of the
Roman Catholic Tradition (Clarendon Press, 1987); John A. Gallagher, Time Past, Time
Future: An HistoricalStudy of Catholic Moral Theology (Paulist Press, 1990).
62. J.A. DiNoia, American Catholic Theology at Century's End- Posconcilliar,
Postmodern, Post-Thomistic 54 The Thomist 499, 503 (1990).
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ment without aggiornamentois empty. Aggiornamento without ressourcement is blind."

Noonan's work on usury illuminates ways in which the fruits
of resourcement and aggiornamentocan be complimentary. For ex-

ample, Noonan calls the scholastic analysis of usury "the only detailed and comprehensive philosophical effort in history to explore
the requirements of justice in the credit operations central to com-

mercial life."' 63 The early tradition's crucial shift from interpreting

usury as a sin of uncharity or avarice to viewing it as a species of
injustice bears the same moral claim as the U.S. Bishops' demand
for a restructuring of international banking practices to improve
the lot of Third World countries.65 The later scholastic tradition's
efforts to circumscribe the absolute prohibition against usury in
light of the experience of Christian merchants in Europe exhibits a
common kernel of insight with the emphasis of liberation theologians upon the unity of theory and practice in the struggle for justice in South America. Of course, the historical and political
contexts of these theological and ethical reflections diverge dramatically. So do the philosophical tools they employ. But even as
Catholic Christians affirm the necessity for those living in different
times and places to respond to the Gospel with their own "freshness," the same Spirit calls us into the "continuity" of eternal community with one another through Christ. 66 Supporting that belief,
John Noonan's work can foster the discernment of new patterns of
unity and difference in the Catholic tradition.
B. A Distinctively Legal Argument
John Noonan concludes his 1965 edition of Contraceptionwith
an optimistic note about the possibility of change in the Church's
prohibition against artificial methods of birth control.67 Having
demonstrated in the volume that at the center of ecclesiastical
teaching were the "values of procreation, education, life, personality and love," he argues that "About these values a wall had been
built; the wall could be removed when it became a prison rather
63. Noonan, Usury at 7 (cited in note 2).
64. Id at 14.
65. National Council of Catholic Bishops, Economic Justicefor All: PastoralLetter on
Catholic Social Teaching and the US.Economy at 1 261-293 (United States Catholic Conference, 1986).
66. Compare Gustavo Gutidrrez, A Theology of Liberation at xliv (Orbis Books,
1988).

67. John T. Noonan, Jr., Contraception (cited in note 4).
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than a bulwark. '" 68 Issued three years after Noonan's book was
published, the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae69 did not remove
the wall. Noonan's reaction to the encyclical is contained in an article entitled "Natural Law, the Teaching of the Church and the
Regulation of the Rhythm of Human Fecundity," which has been
7°
appended to the second edition of Contraception.
In this polarized climate where the only acceptable options are
either "dissent" or "assent" to magisterial teaching on contraception, Noonan's response provoked puzzlement from both sides. 7 '
On the one hand, Noonan begins with the claim that "the time for
debate over doctrine itself is past... The time now is to understand
72
the encyclical and to answer questions within its framework.
Those who oppose Humanae Vitae could fear that Noonan is abandoning the fruits of his intellectually groundbreaking and liberating
work in favor of submission to the magisterium. On the other
hand, the practical import of the appended article is that contraceptive practices must be avoided only a small portion of every
month. Those who support Humanae Vitae could see this as an
attempt to evade the strictures set down by the Pope.
How, then, should Noonan's appendix be perceived? Is it
"dissent from" or "assent to" magisterial teaching? It is neither,
and it is both-at least according to the way these terms are commonly understood. The article exemplifies a distinctively legal
mode of reasoning which fruitfully transcends the rigidity of both
categories. First published in the American Journal of Jurisprudence73 in 1980, it reads like the brief of a lawyer whose argument
is circumscribed but not ultimately undone by the existence of an
authoritative and possibly opposing decision written by an eminent
judge. Without questioning the authority of Humanae Vitae,7 4
Noonan interprets it in such a fashion that the bulk of his book's
argument survives intact.
Consider his strategy. First, having announced his good faith
in attempting to work within the confines of the encyclical, he fore68. Id at 533.
69. Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (cited in note 3).
70. Noonan, Contraception (cited in note 4).
71. See Lisa S. Cahill, Catholic Sexual Ethics and the Dignity of the Person: A Double
Message, 50 Theological Studies 120, 135-137 (1989).
72. Noonan, Contraception at 535 (cited in note 4).
73. John T. Noonan, Jr., Natural Law, the Teaching of the Church and the Regulation
of the Rhythm of Human Fecundity, 24 Am J Juris 16 (1980).
74. Pope Paul VI, Humane Vitae (cited in note 3).
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stalls any attempt to interpret it in light of the purposes of those
opposed to the Second Vatican Council. He insists that Humanae
Vitae75 be read together with Gaudium et Seps.7 6 Secondly, he
stresses the considerable development of doctrine which was ratified by the encyclical and supported by his own historical study:
personalism, the expression of conjugal love as a purpose of marital intercourse, and the duty of married couples to make a responsible judgment about the proper size of their families. Finally,
under the heading "Clarifications" of doctrine, Noonan considers
three case studies designed to test the flexibility within the boundaries of Humanae Vitae. In the third, noting that "nature" implies
"normalcy" in Catholic thought, Noonan suggests that the strictures of the encyclical do not prevent a married couple from using
contraceptives on all but the prudently estimated four days each
month when it is normally probable for intercourse to lead to procreation. After considering possible arguments against his position, Noonan concludes by noting that "it is scarcely an objection
that the scope of a law should be narrow. In general, Christians
have been called to liberty. .. . Do we worship God less because
we are called to worship him formally only one day in seven?" 77
Thus in the appendix, Noonan offers a vision of Humanae Vitae which is continuous in essence if not in all details with the developing personalist values he highlights in the main body of
Contraception.7" Moreover, his interpretation of the encyclical
could facilitate the choice of any future pope to lift its prohibitions
by enabling that choice to be viewed as a further development of
doctrine rather than as a reversal of it. These observations should
satisfy those tempted to charge him with capitulating to magisterial
pressures.
What of the opposite criticism, that he does not show sufficient
"obsequium" for the teaching authority of the Church? First, the
attention and intellectual energy which Noonan expends upon the
encyclical testifies to the respect in which he holds it. His painstaking efforts to trace the encyclical's argument and its implications
appropriately evoke the root word of obsequium (sequor, "to follow"). And secondly, Noonan's response to Humanae Vitae has
precedent within the tradition; it echoes, for example, some of the
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes (cited in note 57).
Noonan, Contraceptionat 554 (cited in note 4).
Id.
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interaction between the magisterium and the theologians regarding
the doctrine on usury. Of these earlier attempts to interpret papal
pronouncements narrowly, Noonan writes "If the legislator allows
a legalistic and close interpretation of his law, it is scarcely the part
of others to challenge his liberality; and in such a case, it is not
discreditable for an interpreter of the law to insist that it not be
extended beyond the cases it formally proscribes. ' '79 Finally, the
larger purposes in light of which Noonan interprets the encyclical
are not alien to it, but are drawn from its very core.
While it would be fruitful to explore in detail the ways in
which Noonan's mode of argumentation differs from more common approaches in Christian ethics, I have space here only to highlight two of the more distinctive features of legal argument. First
and foremost, legal argument is advocacy, not only of a particular
conclusion or result, but of a certain way of viewing the world
which supports and surrounds it. Thus the form of the best arguments at law is not a disinterested attempt to balance the data
yielded by discretely treated scholarly or legal sources. This is not
to say that attention to crucial materials need not be incorporated
into the argument; it is merely to note that admitting they must be
accounted for tells nothing about the mode of their presence. A
dissection can inform us that the human body is composed of given
percentages of various elements. That does not mean we can
mechanically mix those elements together and obtain life. Analogously, a truly excellent legal brief does not merely compile evidence, but proposes a vision of reality (or at least that portion of
reality which is in dispute) that is more complete and compelling
than the vision offered by the opposition. It is an exercise in aesthetics as much as in organization, a task for rhetoric no less than
for logic. 80
Second, the fact that legal argument is oriented toward achieving a certain practical result for one's client means that the way
lawyers approach authoritative sources differs from that of many
scholars. For example, when confronted with an authoritative ecclesiastical pronouncement, many academic ethicists would see
their task as two-fold. First, they would strive to pin down its
meaning as objectively and precisely as possible, and secondly, they
would attempt to respond to that clearly fixed interpretation of the
79. Noonan, Usury at 200 (cited in note 2).
80. For a helpful discussion of legal argument, see James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow:
Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (U of Wisconsin Press, 1985).
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pronouncement. By contrast, the dominant question for a lawyer
is not what to say to a controlling opinion, but what to do with it.
In her efforts, the lawyer does not merely respond to a fixed and
predetermined construal of the opinion, but actually helps shape its
interpretation. The opinion, itself one word in the continuing conversation of law, provides the raw material and the framework
which enable the lawyer to exercise both creativity and judgment
in proposing the next word. Some purposes are emphasized, some
phrasing borrowed; other elements are downplayed or marginalized. Thus the authority of the opinion is not a command for deference imposed upon the lawyer's mind like an extrinsic force.
Rather the opinion's authority lies in the fact that it becomes intrinsically incorporated into the lawyer's thought processes, reciprocally influencing and influenced by them.
Taken together, these points suggest that what Noonan does in
his appendix is advocate a way in which Humanae Vitae can be
better incorporated into the vision of the Church described in Contraception than into that proposed by those who oppose development of doctrine in the area of marriage and birth control. Rather
than slaying the tiger, he tames it. Particularly in these times of
great tension between the Vatican and American Catholicism,
Noonan's lawyerly approach may suggest new tacks to Catholic
theologians striving for faithful creativity within their tradition.
C. Abortion and Development of Doctrine
For over twenty years now, John Noonan has been a forceful
participant in the difficult and divisive contemporary debate about
abortion 81 From his perspective, advocacy of a pro-life position is
profoundly consistent with the moral lessons of history explored in
his other writings; he sees the attitude toward the unborn entailed
by most pro-choice stances as yet another example of the dehumanizing masks which human persons are capable of throwing over
one another's countenances. Needless to say, Noonan's pro-life
writings have provoked vigorous disagreement. While I will not
rehearse the familiar shape of the abortion debate here, I would
like to highlight one criticism which is particularly telling in Noonan's own terms. Feminist ethicist Beverly Wildung Harrison ob81. For example, see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives "Introduction" and "An Almost Absolute Value in History" (Harvard U
Press, 1970); John T. Noonan, Jr., A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies
(The Free Press, 1979).

203]

JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.

jects that in A Private Choice,82 his only book-length work on
abortion, Noonan frequently refers to the pregnant woman by the
equivalent Latin term "gravida.'' s 3 In effect, she charges Noonan
with employing depersonalizing masks of his own, masks which
conceal the pained faces of women confronting crisis pregnancies
under the weight of an imposing Latin term.
Despite their many deep and intractable disagreements, Noonan should be able to affirm wholeheartedly that part of Harrison's
agenda which is expressed in the dedication of her book in gratitude "for the particularity of women's lives" (emphasis mine).
Noonan's great strength as an ethicist has always been his refusal
to turn a blind eye to the complexities and ambiguities moral obligations generate as they are instantiated in the lives of actual
human beings. Showing us time and again that the moral life is
rarely the easiest life, he does not often ignore the human tragedy
which that fact can involve. It is thus even more unfortunate that
in some respects his writings on abortion have a curiously abstract
quality about them. Concentrating upon re-personalizing the unborn, Noonan does not attend as closely as he might to the difficulties facing female persons with problem pregnancies, nor to the
tragedy that in our society those most likely to pay the cost of acting morally with regard to unborn life are those least able to afford
it.
Noonan's other writings suggest a way for him to overcome
this deficiency. He could write a book on abortion which is structured in terms of the "case" method of moral analysis he employs
so effectively in The Power to Dissolve8 5 and most of his later
works.86 This is not to say that if Noonan viewed abortion through
the prism of individual lives and choices he would change his mind
about its ultimate moral status. He might, however, convey a
deeper and ultimately more persuasive sense of the true dimensions of the difficulties which can surround the demand for it.
Yet if Noonan were to decide to write such a book in the
1990s, the contemporary situation regarding abortion might force
82.
83.
at 267
84.

Noonan, A Private Choice (cited in note 81).
Beverly Wildung Harrison, Our Right to Choose: Toward a New Ethic of Abortion
n 25 (Orbis Books, 1983).
Id at "Dedication Page," (emphasis mine).

85. Noonan, The Power to Dissolve (cited in note 5).
86. Noonan, Personsand Masks of the Law (cited in note 30); Noonan, The Antelope
(cited in note 6); Noonan, Bribes (cited in note 7); Noonan, The Believer and the Powers
that Are (cited in note 8).
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him to make hard methodological and substantive theological
choices he has not yet had to face. Noonan's writings reflect not
only a notion of development of doctrine within the Church, but a
conception of the relation between Church and World that resonates deeply with the teachings of the Second Vatican Council and
its theological progenitors (for example, John Henry Newman,
Karl Rahner, John Courtney Murray). Humanity has moved from
a static to an evolutionary conception of its own history87 that exemplifies the promise of real moral progress. The development of
the Church is not isolated, but intimately related to this promise.
"The Church holds that in [Christ] can be found the key, the focal
point, the goal, of human history." 88
Accordingly, Noonan's confidence in the development of
Church teaching on such issues as usury and marital sexuality is
matched by a similar belief in the positive moral trajectory of the
secular world regarding such matters as slavery and bribery. On
the whole, neither realm can be said to lead consistently or to follow slowly behind; Noonan highlights the interweaving of secular
and religious motives on the sometimes tortuous path of moral
growth. This close and ultimately harmonsious relation between
the developing moral vision of the Church and true human wisdom
has allowed Noonan to remain fruitfully ambiguous about the ultimate epistemological warrants in the natural law ethics espoused
by the Catholic tradition. He succinctly summarized the two basic
options in his first book:
On the one hand, any act prohibited by the Christian tradition
could be treated as if it were evil by nature, not by positive law.
On the other hand, any act not naturally demonstrable as evil
89
could be considered as not prohibited by Christian teaching.
As long as Noonan perceives there to be no ultimate conflict between the best insights of humanity and those of the Church, he
does not have to make any choice, but can allow the insights developed in the two realms to play off each other in the history of
moral development.
Yet the protracted nature of the abortion debate may render
such a strategy more difficult to maintain. Assume, as seems likely,
that the Church's teaching will remain strongly pro-life, while the
broader secular consensus settles firmly around a coherent and rig87. Compare Vatican II Guadium et Spes § 5 (cited in note 57).
88. Id at § 10.

89. Noonan, Usury at 27 (cited in note 2).
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orous pro-choice perspective that in all good faith cannot acknowledge the personhood of the unborn. From Noonan's perspective
such a situation begins to call into question the compatibility of
moral reasoning from a humanistic perspective and that done from
the vantage of the Roman Catholic tradition. Moreover, it threatens the perception of an evolution of moral sensibility in both
realms. What are his possible responses to these pressures?
On the one hand, Noonan could attempt to preserve the ultimate compatibility of the insights of the Church with those of the
wider world by taking a longer and more complicated view of
moral development. This could be done in two ways. The less
likely course would be for Noonan to rethink his position on abortion. Concluding that the broad secular consensus and the not inconsiderable opinion of Christians like Beverly Harrison had the
better viewpoint, he could trust that the Church would also revise
its own opinion in time. In effect, this would be to assimilate the
abortion issue to his views on usury and contraception. More
likely, however, would be for Noonan to contend that the Church's
perspective on unborn life will ultimately prevail in the wider society, although it may take a very long time. Moral development
does not preclude human choice. At times, as in the case of the
secular attitude toward abortion, such choices can be tragically
wrong, thereby greatly hindering but not ultimately destroying the
possibility for growth in moral insight. Thus Noonan could maintain the hope for long-term moral improvement in the case of abortion much as in the case of racial equality. However, while this
hope might have been credible in the 1970's, when Noonan wrote
his abortion books, it will become increasingly less so if time passes
without any sign of a shift in moral sensibilities.
On the other hand, Noonan could take a much more radical
methodological route. He could give up the possibility of ultimate
and developing concordance between the best deliverances of faith
and those of secular reason on the abortion question, and by implication, on a whole host of other issues. He could acknowledge that
as the post-Christian, post-modern era wears on, the residual effects of Constantinean Christian morality on the wider culture will
wear thin. Taking this approach immediately implicates matters at
the forefront of contemporary theology. Questions of ecclesiology
present themselves. Will the Church in a post-Christian era inevitably be sectarian? Does sectarianism imply separatism? So do
problems in the theology of history. If we give up the notion of a
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positively evolving human morality, can we still maintain the notion of development of doctrine within the Church? Is not that
notion, particularly as explicated in the Second Vatican Council,
intimately connected with making the light of Christ ever more visible to the nations? Finally, issues at the heart of moral theology
must be faced, particularly those implicating the traditional Catholic commitment to a natural law approach. As noted above it is
theoretically possible to maintain that the strictures of natural law
ethic are ontologically valid for all human beings while simultaneously asserting that only a small portion of humanity (i.e., Christians) have significant epistemological access to it. Yet practically
speaking, does not such a stance retain only the shell of a natural
law approach, while abandoning its central purposes and advantages? If Catholic thought must leave behind its natural law tradition, would it be better to do so more forthrightly? Moreover, with
what should it be replaced?
These are large questions, much easier raised than answered.
They also seem quite far afield from the issue with which we
started this section, the much narrower topic of Noonan's writings
on abortion. Yet if abortion is in fact a moral crisis for contemporary Christianity as well as for the wider community, its ultimate
resolution will not leave fundamental substantive and methodological commitments untouched. If Noonan's histories teach us anything, it is that a true moral crisis inevitably brings theological,
ethical, political, and legal changes in its wake.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Since December, 1985, John Noonan has been a judge on the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which sits in San Francisco. During this time, he has combined his duties on the bench with continued activity as a teacher, writer, and scholar. While the nature of
his responsibilities has shifted in his move from the academy to the
judiciary, his concern for the effect of law on the lives of particular
persons abides. Some of the issues which he has addressed as a
judge could easily provide raw material for his books: whether
Bette Midler can protect the distinctive sound of her voice from
commercial exploitation, 9° whether Robert Alton Harris has the
right to competent psychiatric advice before being sentenced to
90. She can. Midler v Ford Motor Company 849 F2d 460, (US Ct App, 9th Cir 1988).
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death,9 ' and whether in order to gain political asylum, Olimpia
Lazo-Majano must prove a clear probability of arrest or torture if
sent back to El Salvador. 2 Yet if anyone would recognize the crucial difference between his two vocations, it would be Noonan himself. The scholar's work ends with disciplined reflection on the
complexity of the situation in which the litigants have
found them93
selves. The judge must go on to decide their fate.

91. Noonan believed that he does, but the majority disagreed. Harris v Vasquez 913
F2d 606, (US Ct App 9th Cir 1990).
92. No; she merely has to prove a well-founded fear of persecution. Lazo-Marjano v
Immigration & NaturalizationService 813 F2d 1432 (US Ct App 9th Cir 1987).
93. An abridged version of this article was published in 18 Religious Studies 112-17
(1992).

